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1. Overview of situation with regard to terrorism 
 
Two packages of anti-terror legislation in Denmark 
In Denmark, the 9/11 events immediately triggered a series of legislative 
initiatives that were clustered into a single anti-terror package enacted in 
2002. In the wake of the 2006 terrorist bombings in Madrid and London, a 
second anti-terror package was adopted. Consecutively, the two anti-terror 
packages expanded the ambit of substantive criminal law significantly. 
The amendments of provisions in the substantive part of the Penal 
Code (PC) represent far-reaching new forms of criminalisation with a rather 
indeterminate scope. The boundaries of criminal law have been pushed for-
ward in order to encompass various modalities of participation, including 
activities that might represent a hypothetical risk of facilitating actual terror-
ist acts but may actually be only very remotely linked up with such activi-
ties. The actus reus as well as the mens rea requirements for incurring crim-
inal liability are stipulated in quite vague terms, not only in the statutory 
provisions, but also in the preparatory work for the underlying bills. In gen-
eral, the two anti-terror packages consist of precipitate measures based on 
preparatory work lacking sufficient legislative quality. The enacted criminal 
law provisions consist partly of verbatim transcripts of formulations found 
in EU law and other international sources, that are not suitable as paradigms 
for drafting statutes under a domestic legal order.  
 
Terrorism provisions as anchorage point for other legislation 
The provisions regarding terrorist acts and offences related to terrorism en-
shrined in the Penal Code (PC) do not just prescribe a ban on certain acts as 
punishable offences that a perpetrator may be convicted of in a criminal 
court. They also constitute a foundation on which all other legislation on 
combating and preventing terrorism rests, i.e. a common point of reference. 
Thus, the rules laid down in the Penal Code provide the basic setting for 
many other components of the accumulated anti-terror legislation, i.e. for 
regulations that determine the nature and scope of special powers held by 
various government bodies regarding cases involving ”crimes against the 
state”.1  
A whole series of statutes found elsewhere in legislation are linked to 
these provisions. Therefore, the provisions defining terrorist offences are 
integrated and constituent parts of the material criteria for demarcating the 
limits for other offences as well as the boundaries for exercise of various 
powers vested in the courts, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and 
other government authorities. Consequently, the substantive criminal provi-
                                            
1
 Such offences are determined by the provisions in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Penal Code. The anti-terror 
provisions in Sections 114-114 h PC are placed in Chapter 13. 
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sions therefore greatly influence decision-making regarding, for example, 
instigating coercive and particular intrusive measures in criminal investiga-
tions and proceedings, disclosing or exchanging sensitive personal infor-
mation and other kinds of data, refusing to grant citizenship, expelling for-
eigners from the country, placing aliens under detention or restricted condi-
tions, etc. The concerns with respect to the potential undermining of legal 
rights due to the adoption of vague and wide-reaching provisions under sub-
stantive criminal law relate in particular to the contagious effect of the legis-
lative initiatives on decision-making in intelligence, investigative- and ad-
ministrative-law contexts, where there is considerable risk of due process 
and fundamental rights being jeopardized. The provisions are conducive, for 
example, to an exaggerated propensity to authorise disproportionate control 
measures – including, in particular, targeting political activists and people 
with a non-Danish ethnic background – who belong to groups that com-
municates via obscure messages or use militant rhetoric. 
 
1.1 Definition of terrorist acts – Section 114 PC 
The 2002 anti-terror package inserted a new and innovatory Section 114 
into Chapter 13 of the Penal Code.2 The provision did not in itself broaden 
the already existing scope of criminalisation. Evidently, terrorist acts could 
earlier have been punished under previously established provisions concern-
ing various forms of serious crime, irrespective of a perpetrator’s terrorist 
motive. Politically, however, there was a desire “to convey more clearly that 
terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable in a democratic society”.3 Under 
the new Section 114, the maximum penalty for all kinds of terrorist acts 
now became life imprisonment. 
The amended Section 114 contains a definition of “terrorism”, i.e. terror-
ist acts. The definition is basically a verbatim transposition of the definition 
under FD 2002 Article 1. The statutory definition enumerates a number of 
offences (homicide, grave assault, deprivation of liberty, etc.) committed 
with the intent to seriously “intimidating a population”, compelling a Gov-
ernment or an international organisation, or destabilising or destroying the 
social order in certain specified ways. The statute is particularly open and 
far-reaching, among other things because the Penal Code in line with the 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism has adopted the term “destabi-
lise or destroy [...] fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures” [italics added]. The concept of “structures” is not used in a simi-
lar manner anywhere else in Danish legislation. The same provision applies 
to anyone who transports weapons or explosives or threatens to commit 
homicide or assault with the terrorism intent described above. 
                                            
2
 A provision with the same numbering previously contained a so-called “corps ban” against supporting or 
participating in certain militant groups; the provisions have now been moved to Section 114 f and Section 
114 g. 
3
 The Government’s explanatory memorandum to the bill. 
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The mens rea element required under Section 114 may be any form or 
degree of intent. In principle, therefore, even dolus eventualis (Eventualvor-
satz, bedingter Vorsatz) could imply criminal liability.  
The technical completion of the offence stipulated under Section 114 has 
been moved forward in the sense that it depends on the perpetrator’s prepar-
atory acts and the relevant intent, not on the commission of a fully-fledged 
terrorist act. A terrorist act can also consist of threatening to commit one of 
the offences specifically listed under Section 114. 
During the political discussions of 6–7 December 2001 about the Com-
mission’s proposal for a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, a 
Council Statement4 was issued in order to express agreement that the pro-
posed instrument would cover acts “committed by individuals whose objec-
tives constitute a threat to their democratic societies respecting the rule of 
law and the civilisation upon which these societies are founded”. Further, it 
was stated that the Framework Decision “cannot be construed so as to argue 
that the conduct of those who has acted in the interest of preserving or re-
storing these democratic values… could now be considered as “terrorist 
acts”.  
According to the quoted Council Statement, the Framework Decision 
can also not be construed so as to incriminate on terrorist grounds “persons 
exercising their fundamental rights to manifest their opinions, even if in the 
course of the exercise of such rights they commit offences”. In principle, 
this implies that demonstrators and activists cannot normally be charged 
under sections related to terrorism. The legal boundaries are, however, still 
fluid. 
The Council Statement regarding the interpretation of the Framework 
Decision is quoted in the memorandum issued by the Danish Parliament’s 
Judiciary Committee to accompany the bill concerning the 2002 anti-
terrorism package. The Committee noted that the Council Statement should 
be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the new statute to rule out 
criminal liability in atypical cases not reasonably meant to be covered.  
The phrasing chosen in Section 114 is essentially the same as that of the 
Framework Decision. Wording of this sort is not necessarily suitable when 
it comes to defining offences under national criminal law, where a higher 
degree of precision should ideally be sought in accordance with a lex certa 
principle. Indeed, other Member States have opted to implement the frame-
work decision in completely different ways than Denmark. 
The new provision under Section 114 operates with a general maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment. Qualifying all underlying offences in question 
by enhancing the maximum penalty indiscriminately to life imprisonment 
implies that there is no statute of limitations for any of the offences listed.  
 
                                            
4
 Council Statement 109/02. 
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Glostrup case:5 T was found guilty of attempted terrorism [attempted homicide]. T and 
two young co-defendants were charged with planning a trip to Bosnia in order to procure 
weapons and explosives for use in a terrorist act at an unspecified location. The co-
defendants M1 and M2 subsequently acquired approx. 19.8 kg of explosives, a suicide 
belt, a suicide video, a detonator and a pistol with a silencer and ammunition. The at-
tempted offences were prevented by the arrest of M1 and M2 by the local police in Bos-
nia. Both were subsequently convicted by Bosnian courts of planning a terrorist act and 
sentenced to prison for eight and six years, respectively.  
Initially, T was supposed to travel with the other two to Bosnia, but he was prevented 
from doing so by his father who had learned of the plans and confiscated his passport. 
Observing that, on the one hand, T had been found guilty of attempting the most serious 
form of terrorism, and that, on the other hand, he had merely just turned 16 at the time of 
the offence, the Supreme Court sentenced him to seven years imprisonment.  
Three co-defendants were found guilty by the jury but the verdicts were overruled by 
the High Court judges. The Director of Prosecution [Da: Rigsadvokaten] subsequently 
dropped the charges against two of the three and pursued a new indictment against the 
third. At the retrial, this defendant was acquitted by the jury despite the presiding judge 
favouring a guilty verdict in his summing-up previous to the jury’s deliberations. 
The case gave rise to discussion about the quality of evidence and the admittance of 
witness evidence regarding the defendants’ religious beliefs and possible radicalisation, 
including testimony by one of the defendants’ former teachers.  
 
Vollsmose case:6 Three defendants were convicted of attempted terrorism [attempted 
homicide and bomb detonation] for jointly, by acquiring fertilizer chemicals and labora-
tory equipment, and by producing home-brewed explosives, having made preparations 
for the manufacture of one or more bombs for use in a terrorist act at an unspecified loca-
tion. The Supreme Court stated that the ordinary sentence for attempted terrorism by 
bomb detonation and homicide is 12 years imprisonment.7 A fourth defendant was entire-
ly acquitted by the jury. The case raised questions about the Danish Security and Intelli-
gence Service’s [Da: Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET] use of informants and under-
cover agents, the partial lack of disclosure of case documents to the defence, the introduc-
tion of character witnesses, and the court’s exclusion of defence witnesses.  
 
Glasvej case:8 Two defendants aged 22 were found guilty of attempted terrorism by ac-
quiring bomb manuals and chemicals, and by producing and detonating TATP, an unsta-
ble explosive which they had tested on the staircase in the building where they lived and 
in other places. There had been contacts with al-Qaeda, and that the main perpetrator had 
attended training camps in Waziristan. The main perpetrator was sentenced to 12 years 
imprisonment, the co-defendant to eight years.  
 
Axe attack on ’Mohammad’ cartoonist:9 A 28-year-old Somalian man was convicted, 
inter alia, of attempted terrorism by endeavouring to assassinate the newspaper cartoonist 
Kurt Westergaard. The defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The perpetra-
tor broke into the cartoonist’s house in the evening of 1 January 2010 by smashing a win-
dow with an axe. His intention to kill the cartoonist was thwarted because the latter had 
taken refuge in his bathroom, which the police had previously secured as a panic safe-
                                            
5
 U 2008.127 H. 
6
 U 2008.1587 H. 
7
 Twelve years imprisonment is also the ordinary punishment for completed homicide. The normal penalty 
for attempted homicide is six years’ imprisonment.  
8
 TfK 2009.762 Ø. 
9
 Western High Court ruling, 21 June 2011. 
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room, and because the police arrived minutes after Westergaard had pushed the emergen-
cy button. 
In the High Court, the judges and three jurors voted to uphold the ruling of the mu-
nicipal court, while the other three jurors voted to acquit the defendant of the count re-
garding attempted terrorism.  
 
Lors Doukaev case:10 A 25-year-old Chechen residing in Belgium was convicted, inter 
alia, of attempted terrorism by being in possession of a bomb containing TATP, which he 
intended to send to the offices of the newspaper Jyllands-Posten that initially published 
the Mohammad cartoons. The perpetrator entered Denmark under a false name, regis-
tered at the Hotel Jørgensen in downtown Copenhagen using a second fake identity, and 
ordered a bus ticket to Liège under yet another false name. He brought with him to Den-
mark the bomb device and a gun. Visiting various shops he wore varying disguises. The 
bomb exploded in his hands in a bathroom at the hotel where he was lodging, and after a 
dramatic chase he was arrested in a nearby public park.  
As a result of an explosion when he was a child in Chechnya, the defendant wore a 
prosthetic leg. He had removed serial numbers from it, as well as from the gun, which 
might otherwise have identified him. 
 
Planned attack on newspaper building Jyllandsposten/Politikens Hus.11 Four individuals 
residing in Sweden departed for Copenhagen and were arrested and charged with con-
spiray to attack and kill people in the newspaper building on the Copenhagen town square 
Jyllandsposten/Politikens Hus. They were all convisted and sentenced to 12 years impris-
onment. One of the defendants appealed, but the High Court substained the municipal 
courtøs judgement. 
 
Activist arsonists case:12 Five militant activists have been charged with attempted terror-
ism. The charges include arson attacks and attempted attacks on the Police Educational 
Centre, the Police Intelligence and Security headquarters, the Parliament building, the 
Greek Embassy and several buildings belonging to private companies, e.g. in the fur 
trade. The defendants were only convicted on part of the indictment, and the jury didn’t 
reach a majority on favor of conviction for terrorist acts under Section 114. The case is 
currently pending on appeal. 
 
1.2 Experience of terrorism and level of threat 
In a relatively large number of cases, defendants have been indicted and 
convicted under the new anti-terror packages. The cases that have been ad-
judicated reflect the impact on Islamic radicalisation deriving from the fact, 
that Denmark is a close ally to the U.S.A., that the Danish Government has 
been a very active participant in the military operations in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, that the political climate in Denmark is to some degree tainted by xen-
ophobic and anti-Muslim sentiments, and that the publication of the car-
toons of the Prophet Mohammad in the newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been 
widely noticed internationally and has caused anger and uproar in Muslim 
communities.  
                                            
10
 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 30 May 2011. 
11
 Glostrup Municipal Court judgement, 4 June 2012, and Eastern High Court judgement, 25 January 2013. 
12
 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 13 December 2012. 
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In an assessment report of 10 January 2013, the Centre for Terror Analy-
sis, CTA, under the National Security and Intelligence Service, PET, it is 
stated that the terror threat against Denmark remains significant. It primarily 
emanates from groups, networks and individuals who adhere to a militant 
Islamist ideology. The threat is mainly directed towards targets with affilia-
tion to the Cartoon Case. CTA assesses that in the future militant Islamists 
will also identify other targets, including targets of symbolic value or easily 
accessible and unprotected targets. In the summary of the report, the CTA 
further notices the following:13  
 
“An increasing number of individuals from the West, including Denmark, seek out re-
gions affected by violent conflict. Stays in such regions may lead to contact with militant 
Islamists and, thus, a risk of being radicalised. CTA assesses that there is an added risk of 
terror-related activities when such individuals return home. 
CTA assesses that small groups and individuals associated with political left- or 
rightwing extremist circles in Denmark pose a certain terror threat. The terrorist attacks in 
Norway on 22 July 2011 and other events abroad may have an inspirational effect on 
individuals and groups in Denmark. In left-wing extremist circles there are individuals 
who have the will and capacity to commit serious, violent crimes, including arson and 
attacks on political opponents. 
CTA assesses that a terrorist attack in Denmark could be executed using easily accessible 
weapons such as stabbing weapons, small arms, incendiary bombs or home made bombs. 
A terrorist attack can take place without prior intelligence-based indications. 
CTA assesses that the continued militant Islamists focus on Denmark may make Danes 
and Danish interests the target of terrorist attack and kidnapping in certain parts of the 
world. The primary terror threat to Danes abroad emerges when they are in places that 
may be local terrorist targets. 
The risk of falling victim to a terrorist attack in Denmark or abroad remains very limited, 
except in certain foreign conflict zones.” 
A number of specific issues are covered in reports posted on CTA’s web-
site. 
 
1.3 Overview of counter terrorism legislation 
Inspiration for the amended Penal Code provisions concerning miscellane-
ous types of conduct more or less closely related to actual terrorist acts was 
primarily derived from the templates used in the design of various UN legal 
instruments. 
The series of scetions on counter terrorism now encompassed by the Penal 
code includes Sections 114 (terrorist acts), Section 114 a (terrorism-like of-
fences), Section 114 b (financing and support, ect.), Section 114 c (recruit-
ing), Section 114 d (training), Section 114 e (facilitation), and Section 136 
(incitement). For details, see below. 
 
                                            
13
 See https://www.pet.dk/~/media/Engelsk/2013VTDENGENDpdf.ashx.  
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1.4 Legal qualification of public provocation, recruitment and training 
 
Public incitement to crime 
The 2005 European Convention obliges signatories to criminalise public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence. Under Danish law, this did not 
necessitate any criminalisation of new offences, as the Penal Code already 
contains a general provision on public incitement to “crime”, see Section 
136(1) PC.14 Until the above mentioned 2007 judgement in the case against 
the Danish-Moroccan Said Mansour, this provision had not been used since 
1938. 
 
Public approval of a crime against the State, etc.  
Indirectly, the two anti-terror packages criminalised expressions of sympa-
thy in relation to terrorism activity to a wider extent than was previously the 
case. An old provision regarding public approval of a crime against the 
State is contained in Section 136 (2) PC. Technically, this statute is com-
pleted by a general reference to all offences under Chapters 12 and 13 of the 
Penal Code. As the statutes on terrorism offences are placed in Chapter 13, 
the anti-terror packages have endowed Section 136(2) with a broader range 
of application.  
 
Active recruitment or training for terrorism, etc. 
Under the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, re-
cruitment and training for terrorism must be criminalised. The 2006 anti-
terror package contained two long-winded sections about this, cf. the 
amended statutes under Section 114 c and Section 114 d. Both of these pro-
visions relate not only to actions covered by the actual provision on terrorist 
acts in Section 114 but also to the additional provision on terror-like activi-
ties under the new Section 114 a.15 Both Section 114 c and Section 114 d 
include activities that might lead someone to either commit or facilitate an 
as yet unspecified terrorist act or terror-like activity.  
The first sentence of the first subsections of each of the two provisions 
reads as follows: 
 
“Section 114 c (1). Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on an-
yone who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by 
SectionSection 114 or 114 a or to join a group or association in order to fa-
cilitate that the group or association commits acts of this nature.” 
 
“Section 114 d (1). Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on 
                                            
14
 The maximum punishment under Section 136 (2) is imprisonment for up to 2 years. 
15
 Both Section 114 c and Section 114 d authorise enhanced sentencing maxima: “Under particularly aggra-
vating circumstances, the maximum sentence may be increased to imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particu-
larly aggravating circumstances are considered to involve offences of a systematic or organised nature.” 
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anyone who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to 
commit or facilitate acts covered by SectionSection 114 and 114 a, knowing 
that this person has an intention to use the skills to pursue such an aim.” 
 
The mens rea requirement under both of the cited provisions is intent. How-
ever, it is uncertain what the requirement is with respect to the concretiza-
tion of such an intent in relation to the activities towards which the recruit-
ment/training is aimed.  
Ostensibly, the offences criminalised under Section 114 d (1) might in-
clude training in skills that it, under certain circumstances, could be perfect-
ly legal to acquire and practise, but which can also be used in connection 
with a terrorist or terrorist-like action. However, the mens rea requirement 
is twofold intensified. Liability for a “teacher” requires that the “pupil” in-
tends to use the acquired skills for the stipulated purpose, and that the for-
mer has knowledge of this, i.e. acts with direct intent.  
 
Active recruitment or training for financing of terrorism, etc. 
The second subsections of Section 114 c and Section 114 d ban recruitment 
and training to commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114 b, which, as 
mentioned above, prohibits various forms of financial support for terrorists 
or terrorist organisations.16 The wording is as follows: 
 
“Section 114 c (2). Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on any-
one who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by Sec-
tion 114 b or to join a group or association in order to facilitate the group or 
association to commit acts of this nature.” 
 
“Section 114 d (2). Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on an-
yone who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to 
commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114 b, knowing that this person 
has an intention to use the skills to pursue such an aim.” 
 
Passive recruitment or training for terrorism, etc. 
The new provisions in the second anti-terror package also made it a criminal 
offence to “let yourself” be recruited or trained “to commit or facilitate” 
terrorist acts or terror-like acts, cf. Section 114 c (3) and Section 114 d (3) 
respectively. Violations are punished by imprisonment of up to 6 years. 
The European Convention does not in any way oblige the signatory 
states to establish such criminalisation. In the preparatory comments by the 
Danish Government to the bill, this spectacular legislative innovation was 
merely explained by a bland remark that, as a counterpart to the criminalisa-
tion of active recruitment and training for terrorism, it would allegedly be 
“natural” to also criminalise letting yourself be recruited or trained “to 
commit terrorist acts”, and that this would be in line with the general trend 
                                            
16
 In 114 b there is, as mentioned, a reference to the terrorist acts and terror-like acts covered by Section 114 
and Section 114 a. 
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to advance the boundaries for the use of criminal law to protect society 
against terrorism.  
Recently Section 114 d (3) has received a great deal of public attention, 
not least due to report regarding Danish citizens and residents allegedly 
travelling to training camps run by terrorist groups in Somalia and the Mid-
dle East. The first appearance of Section 114 d (3) in a court judgament 
came in March 2013. 
 
The Somalian brothers from Aarhus:17 Two young brothers of Somalian origin were con-
victed of letting the older brother be trained, instructed or in other ways taught to commit 
acts of terror. According to the judgement, the older brother har received training in a al-
Shabaab camp in Somalia. His younger brother, who stayed in Aarhus, was convicted of 
criminal participation by transferring money and by aiding and abetting. Both defandants 
were sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years and 6 months. They both appealed the 
judgement on a plea of acquittal. The appellate case is pending. 
 
 
2. National legal framework on combating terrorism 
 
2.1 Provisions on aiding or abetting, inciting and attempting an offence 
 
General provisions on criminal participation and attempt 
Danish law is unusually far-reaching in terms of stipulating the scope of 
criminal participation and attempt. The statutes to this effect are general in 
nature and, in principle, apply to any particular substantive offence, whether 
covered by the Penal Code or other legislation. The obligations under Arti-
cle 4 are met by virtue of the general provisions in Section 21 PC and Sec-
tion 23 PC as cited below. These provisions also apply to the specific provi-
sions criminalising preparatory terrorism offences like finanicing, facilita-
tion, recruitment, training and incitement, implying that the scope of crimi-
nal law in this area has become extremely wide. 
It is a punishable offence under Danish law in some way to aid, abet, in-
cite, etc.  a specific criminal enterprise, e.g. a specific terrorist act or some 
other type of terrorism offence. The defendant will in that case become lia-
ble either as a co-perpetrator or as an accomplice to the act in question, pos-
sibly with reference to the general and extremely broad provision on crimi-
nal participation in Section 23 PC, see author’s translation below. Such lia-
bility requires that the defendant has acted with some degree of concretised 
intent that the main offence be completed, e.g. with regard to location, time 
and method. 
 
                                            
17
 Aarhus Municipal Court, 25 March 2013. 
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“Section 23(1)(1) PC: The statute criminalizing a particular offence 
applies to anyone who by inciting, councelling or aiding participated 
in the act.” 
 
It is a punishable preparatory offence under Danish law in some way to 
commit an act aiming at te promotion or accomplishment of acriminal 
offence, e.g. a concrete terrorist act or some other type of terrorism 
offence. The defendant will in that case be convicted of criminal at-
tempt with reference to the general and extremely broad provision in 
Section 21 PC, se author’s translation below.  
 
“Section 21(1) PC: Acts which aim at the promotion or accomplish-
ment of a criminal offence shall be punished, when the offence is not 
completed, as criminal attempt.” 
 
In the jurisprudence concerning terrorist acts under Section 114 PC, convic-
tions in all cases have been for criminal attempt, not completed terror. 
 
Financing of and support for terrorism, ect. 
The 2002 anti-terror legislation made it a criminal offence to support a ter-
rorist or a terrorist organisation as such, or to facilitate such a person’s or 
entity’s activities, even in instances hwere the general, and rather wide-
reaching,  rules regarding co-perpetration by aiding and abetting a specific 
terrorist act or terror-like act do not apply.  
Providing economic or financial support to a terrorist, a terrorist group, 
or a terrorist organisation, may constitute a violation of the exceedingly 
vague provision on financing, etc., in Section 114 b PC:18 
 
 
“Section 114 b. Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on any-
one who  
1) directly or indirectly provides financial support for,  
2) directly or indirectly procures or collects funds for, or  
3) directly or indirectly makes money, other assets or financial or oth-
er similar services available to  
a person, group or association that commits or intends to commit acts cov-
ered by Section 114 or Section 114 a.”19 
 
This provision also targets the funding of organisations whose activities in-
clude both humanitarian and terrorist activities.  
 
                                            
18
 Originally Section 114 a PC. 
19
 Author's italics. Regarding the current Section 114 a, see below about terror-like acts introduced in 2006 
under the second anti-terror package. 
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Fighters+Lovers case:20 Six activists were indicted for attempt to procure funding for 
terrorist organisations. They had been involved, via the company Fighters+Lovers, in 
selling T-shirts worth approx. DKK 25,000 in order to transfer a portion of the profit to 
the organisations FARC21 and the PFLP.22 Allegedly, the money was earmarked for pur-
chasing radio equipment for FARC and a printing press for the PFLP. All defendants 
were acquitted by the municipal court which did not on the merits of the case find suffi-
cient grounds to consider FARC and PFLP as terrorist organisations. On appeal, the High 
Court found them guilty.  
The High Court held that FARC has been responsible for launching indiscriminate 
mortar attacks in which civilians were victims, and that FARC has killed civilians, sub-
jected civilians to serious violence and carried out kidnappings, including of politicians 
and a presidential candidate, in order to undermine the political process in Columbia. 
As far as the PFLP is concerned, the Court found that the organisation had, in a num-
ber of incidents, attacked and killed civilians, e.g. by using car bombs and suicide bomb-
ers, and that PFLP’s militant wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, had carried out at-
tacks, including suicide attacks, in which civilians had been killed and wounded.  
The fact that the funds were allegedly raised for humanitarian purposes was insignifi-
cant to the High Court’s ruling on the question of guilt or innocence. However, one of the 
judges stated that FARC must be considered a rebel movement and the PFLP a resistance 
movement and that such organisations therefore cannot be assigned the required terrorism 
intent. Thus, this member of the Court voted to acquit all of the defendants entirely. 
One of the defendants had been indicted solely for the reason that he had placed a 
poster on his hot-dog cart displaying the T-shirts and a web address. The Court found his 
participation too insufficient for a conviction.  
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court ruling. Two defendants were sentenced to 
6 months imprisonment, two defendants were sentenced to 4 months imprisonment, and 
two defendants were sentenced to 2 months imprisonment, but all sentences were sus-
pended due to an acknowledgement of the fact that the reach of Section 114 b PC had 
been questionable previous to the trial. 
 
’Rebellion’ case:23 The association ’Rebellion’ [Da: Foreningen Oprør] published docu-
ments on its website, calling for European solidarity movements to participate in continu-
ing resistance to anti-terror legislation, terror lists, and the international ’war on terror’. 
The documents stated that substantial amounts had been transferred to the PFLP and 
FARC. The documents were seized, and a spokesperson for the association was convicted 
and sentenced to six months suspended imprisonment.  
 
Horserød-Stutthof Foreningen & Den Faglige Klub:24 A 72 year old chairman for an 
association of former concentration camp prisoners was convicted and sentenced to six 
months imprisonment, of which four months were suspended. Subsequently to the Fight-
ers+Lovers judgement, the association has collected DKK 17,700 for PFLP. Further, the 
chairman for a labour union movement was convicted and sentenced to six months sus-
pended imprisonment for collecting DKK 10,000 for FARC. 
 
Al-Aqsa case:25 In 2005, charges were brought under Section 114 b (originally Section 
114 a) against the chairperson and treasurer of the al-Aqsa Association in Denmark. The 
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 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. 
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 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
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 U 2007.1831 HK and Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 March 2010. 
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 Copenhagen Municipal Court judgement, 16 June 2011. 
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investigation was initiated in 2002, when information was received that members of the 
association had collected and transferred funds to organisations and individuals in the 
Middle East with links to Hamas, which is on the EU terror list. The prosecution service 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that the involved organisations were part of Hamas. 
The High Court therefore upheld a municipal court acquittal by a vote of 3–3. 
 
The mens rea requirement under Section 114 b is intent, and even the lowest 
degree of intent is sufficient, e.g. an assumption that the recipient or client 
would have some kind of connection to terrorism.  
 
Promoting terrorism 
An “extended complicity rule” has been added to the Penal Code, which 
now prohibits any form of assistance, etc., to an individual, a group or an 
association that commits or has the intention to commit terrorism or act re-
lated to terrorism, cf. Section 114 e.26 This statute even covers activity 
which cannot be attributed to specific terrorist acts 
 
“114 e. Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on anyone who oth-
erwise advances the activities of an individual, a group or an association, 
committing or intending to commit actions included in SectionSection 114, 
114 a, 114 b, 114 c, or 114 d.”  
 
According to the preparatory works of the anti-terror packages, the aim of 
this provision is, inter alia, to target anyone who provides professional and 
general advice that is not directly related to a specific terrorist act, e.g. in the 
form of a lawyer or accountant offering assistance to an organisation that 
the provider knows commits terrorist acts. This may imply the attribution of 
criminal liability to “a person who, in relation to a specific act of terror may 
only be complicit at third or fourth hand”.27 However, at the core of the stat-
ute there is naturally a portion of reason, and courts have not applied the 
provision excessively.  
 
Said Mansour case:28 The very first indictment under the new anti-terror provisions was 
raised against a Danish citizen of Moroccan origin. This radical Islamist was found guilty 
of public incitement to crime and hate speech. The defendant had produced and distribut-
ed materials that explicitly call for militant jihad, including by virtue of known terrorists 
being depicted in the material and of suicide bombings and the killing of innocent hos-
tages being celebrated. He was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment.  
 
Al-Aqsa case: In the aforementioned case concerning two members of the al-Aqsa associ-
ation in Denmark and the association per se, the charges were in principle brought under 
Section 114 b, or subordinately under 114 e. As previously mentioned, the case referred 
to the collection and transfer of funds to certain organisations in the Middle East. 
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 The Government’s explanatory memorandum to the bill. 
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TRO Denmark case:29 In the television news programme Sunday Magazine broadcast by 
Danmarks Radio, the organisation Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation was accused of 
having sent money collected for tsunami victims to the Tamil Tigers, an organisation that 
appears on the EU terror list. The Canadian intelligence service had labelled TRO Canada 
as a front for the Tamil Tigers. Accounts belonging to the organisation were seized by the 
Danish authorities. In the course of the investigations, TRO Denmark was added to the 
USA’s terror list, but the Court was not sufficiently furnished with in-depth information 
as to why the organisation had been included in that list. However, the Court found that 
the conditions for seizure (“freezing”) with a view to confiscation had been met by refer-
ence to inclusion on the American list.  
 
ROJ TV A/S & Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV:30 The charge concerns repeat broad-
casting of propaganda in favour of the Kurdish organisation PKK/Kongra Gel, which has 
been blacklisted by the EU. The broadcasts include interviews with PKK-leaders and 
sympathizers, coverage of battles between Kurds and Turkish authorities, and reports 
from PKK-training camps. The prosecutor maintained that the broadcasting-system had 
acted as a mouthpiece for PKK by glorification of PKK and terrorism actions committed 
by the organisation. The indictment was addressed to the corporation as a legal person. 
The municipal court ruled that PKK is a terrorist organisation and that the broadcast 
company’s biased coverage could be characterised as propaganda for PKK. Each of the 
two companies were convicted under Section 114 e and sentenced to 45 dayfines à 
65.000 DKK. The case is currently under appellate review. 
 
Terror-like offences 
The 2006 anti-terrorism package further extended the scope of criminalisa-
tion in a very peculiar and rather diffuse way, including via the insertion of 
a new Section 114 a into the Penal Code. Reference was made to a wish to 
accede to the 2005 convention on the Prevention of Terrorism established 
by the Council of Europe. Basically, the Convention obligates states to 
criminalise incitement/recruiting/training in terrorism. However, at the time 
when the instrument was being prepared, agreement could not be reached on 
a general definition of terrorism. The Convention therefore only contains an 
empty framework provision for so-called terrorist offences. This concept is 
then completed by reference to a number of older conventions, listed in an 
appendix to the new convention. These conventions deal with terrorist acts 
as well as other types of offences, without necessarily identifying a particu-
lar purpose, motive or intent with respect to intimidating a population, 
threatening a government, etc. The conventions cover security for diplo-
mats, airlines, maritime vessels, nuclear-power plants and platforms on the 
continental shelf. They also cover hostage-taking, terrorist bombings and 
the funding of terrorism. Admittedly, these conventions were adopted with 
an overall aim of combating terrorism in various guises, but they also in-
clude a diverse range of other types of acts. The conventions reflect the fact 
that the UN has not been able to establish a consensus on a uniform defini-
tion of terrorism, which is why a “salami-slicer method” has been employed 
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instead. When, occasionally, the opportunity presented itself by the occur-
rence of yet another type of serious attack on common goods recognised as 
such by the international society, an additional convention was introduced, 
focusing on specific types of actions, of which some, but not all, have a ter-
rorist aim.  
The new Section 114 a lists the above-mentioned conventions. It does 
not as such establish new sui generis crimes, but basically authorises en-
hanced sentences for offences that are covered by such treaties but which do 
not constitute terrorist acts in the stricter sense of Section 114.  
 
“114 a. If one of the acts mentioned under para. 1-6 below is committed 
without the act being covered by Section 114, the punishment may exceed 
the statutory maximum penalty for the offence by up to half [...].”31 
 
The cited opening of the statute is followed by a long-winded and compli-
cated catalogue, in six separate paragraphs, of offences that trigger the pre-
scribed enhancement of the ordinarily authorised sentencing maximum. 
Each paragraph consists of a long list of selected provisions from the sub-
stantive part of the Penal Code, accompanied by a requirement that the par-
ticular offence is also covered by one of the specified treaty provisions. For 
considerations of space, only the simplest paragraph, which is found in 114 
a (3) will be cited here: 
 
“3) Violation of Section 261 (1) or (2) when the act is covered by Article 
(1) of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages dated 17 
December 1979.” 
 
Each of the five other paragraphs lists a dozen separate statutes from the 
Penal Code. No other provision in the Code has ever been phrased in a style 
even remotely resembling this chaotic and illegible manner.  
In itself, Section 114 a solely concerns stricter sentencing latitudes. 
However, since all the other statutes regarding the prevention of terrorism 
refer directly to Section 114 a, this provision actually creates several new 
criminal offences. The odd statute constitutes a link to other provisions, in-
cluding the section on support and funding,32 the special and very wide-
ranging complicity rule,33 the new sections on recruitment and training for 
terrorism or terrorist-like acts,34 as well as the provision about public in-
citement or approval of the offences covered by part 12 or part 13 of the 
Penal Code.35  
                                            
31
 The second part of the first paragraph under Section 114 a provides that the punishment under certain 
conditions can be enhanced to imprisonment for up to six years, although the ordinary maximum sentence 
for the offence concerned is less than four years imprisonment. 
32
  Section 114 b PC. 
33
  Section 114 e PC. 
34
  Section 114 c and Section 114 d, respectively. 
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Evaluation study of the legal framework applicable to combatting terrorism: Denmark 
National Rapporteur: Jørn Vestergaard, Professor of Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen 
 
 
17
When in 2008, the Framework Decision on combatting terrorism was 
amended to include provisions equivalent to those of the European Conven-
tion, no additional legislative initiative was needed under Danish law. 
 
 
2.2 Definition and liability of legal persons 
As a kind of secondary effect, the 2002 anti-terror package considerably 
expanded the area in which penalties may be imposed on legal persons 
(“corporate liability”) under Section 306 of the Penal Code. A legal person 
can now become criminally liable for any violation of a Penal Code statute. 
 
“Section 306. Criminal liability can be attributed to companies, etc. (legal 
persons) under the rules contained in Chapter 5 for violation of this Act.” 
 
In this connection, too, the stated reason for the amendment was a reference 
to the requirements contained in the UN Convention on the prevention of 
Terrorism. However, the scope of the Penal Code’s provision on corporate 
liability is completely general in reach, as it doesn’t merely include terror-
related activities, but any violation of a Penal Code statute.  
 
 
2.3. Types and levels of criminal penalties 
 
Section 114: 
Under Section 114, the maximum penalty for all kinds of terrorist acts is 
life imprisonment. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the ordinary sentence for attempted terrorism by bomb detonation and 
homicide is 12 years imprisonment (Vollsmose-case, cited above). 
 
Section 114 b: 
 
“Section 114 b. Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on any-
one who  
1) directly or indirectly provides financial support for,  
2) directly or indirectly procures or collects funds for, or  
3) directly or indirectly makes money, other assets or financial or oth-
er similar services available to  
a person, group or association that commits or intends to commit acts cov-
ered by Section 114 or Section 114 a.”36 
 
In the previously cited Fighters+Lovers case, two defendants were sen-
tenced to 6 months imprisonment, two defendants were sentenced to 4 
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months imprisonment, and two defendants were sentenced to 2 months im-
prisonment, but the Supreme Court suspended all sentences due to an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the reach of Section 114 b PC had been 
questionable previous to the trial. 
 
In the previously cited ’Rebellion’ case, a spokesperson for the association 
was convicted and sentenced to six months suspended imprisonment.  
 
In the above mentioned case regarding Horserød-Stutthof Foreningen & 
Den Faglige Klub, the 72 year old chairman for the association of former 
concentration camp prisoners was and sentenced to six months imprison-
ment, of which four months were suspended. Further, the chairman for a 
labour union movement was convicted and sentenced to six months sus-
pended imprisonment. 
 
Section 114 c and d: 
 
“Section 114 c. Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on any-
one who recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by Sec-
tionSection 114 or 114 a or to join a group or association in order to facili-
tate that the group or association commits acts of this nature. 
Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on anyone who 
recruits another person to commit or facilitate acts covered by Section 114 
b or to join a group or association in order to facilitate the group or associa-
tion to commit acts of this nature.” 
 
“Section 114 d. Imprisonment of up to 10 years shall be imposed on any-
one who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to 
commit or facilitate acts covered by SectionSection 114 and 114 a, knowing 
that this person has an intention to use the skills to pursue such an aim. 
Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on anyone who 
trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or fa-
cilitate acts covered by Section 114 b, knowing that this person has an in-
tention to use the skills to pursue such an aim.” 
 
To “let yourself” be recruited or trained “to commit or facilitate” terrorist 
acts or terror-like acts shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 6 years, 
cf. Section 114 c (3) and Section 114 d (3) respectively. 
 
In the previously cited case regarding the Somalian brothers from Aarhus, 
two defendants were sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years and 6 months.  
 
“114 e. Imprisonment of up to 6 years shall be imposed on anyone who oth-
erwise advances the activities of an individual, a group or an association, 
committing or intending to commit actions included in SectionSection 114, 
114 a, 114 b, 114 c, or 114 d.”  
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In the previously cited Said Mansour case, the defendant was sentenced to 
three years and six months imprisonment.  
 
 
2.4 Aggravating circumstances in the determination of penalties 
As previously demonstrated, sentencing latitudes are rather wide, and the 
provisions on terrorism offences do not specify aggravating circmstances in 
particular. 
 
 
2.5 Provisions governing the initiation of investigation or prosecution 
 
Investigation of terrorist acts and other terrorism offences 
Regarding the traditional rules on initiation of investigating, surveillance, 
interception of communications, search and seizure, discovery of docu-
ments, preventive measures, etc., see the 2007 country profile on Denmark 
on the site of CODEXTER.  
Regarding special provisions enacted by the two anti-terror packages, 
see subsection in the country fiche. 
 
The prosecutorial authority of the Minister of Justice 
Traditionally, Chapter 13 of the Penal Code covers ’crimes against the con-
stitution and the supreme Government authorities, etc.’, i.e. attacks on the 
State’s internal security. The new provisions introduced by the two anti-
terror packages form part of Chapter 13. The 2006 anti-terror legislation 
added ’terrorism’ to the title of the chapter.  As a matter of principle, of-
fences referred to in Chapter 13 of the Penal Code are prosecuted only on 
the orders of the Minister of Justice, cf. 118 a PC. This scheme rely on the 
fact that in some instances such offences are tainted by political components 
and are rather vaguely described and of uncertain reach. Actually, the men-
tioned scheme does not imply that the Minister personally assesses whether 
an indictment should be invoked. In practice, a recommendation to this ef-
fect is prepared and submitted by the Director of Prosecution [Da: Rigsad-
vokaten], and the Minister will normally adhere to the prosecutor’s advice. 
All things being equal, however, the fluid state of the law in this area im-
plies a significant risk of politicization, arbitrariness and abuse of power in 
relation to intelligence gathering, investigation and the way in which the 
prosecution service exercises discretion.  
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2.6 Territorial reach and jurisdiction 
 
Not only attacks on Danish national interests are covered by Sections 114-
114 e PC. The overall object of protection can be “a country or an interna-
tional organisation”, and the territorial reach of the anti-terror provisions is 
not subject to limitations. The provisions also include acts that do not re-
quire that force is deployed in order to exert influence on Danish affairs or 
to undermine the Danish social order, but are directed against the fundamen-
tal interests of other countries or international organisations. As far as sec-
tions 114 b-e PC are concerned, this is made explicit by a reference to Sec-
tion 114 and Section 114 a. Thus, these provisions also serve to protect pub-
lic affairs and social orders elsewhere, including from acts committed ex-
clusively abroad. This is a consequence of a desire to better address terror-
ism’s global reach, as required under Security Council Resolution 1373.  
And as demonstrated by the judgements in the above mentioned cases 
regarding support of FARC and PFLP, even oppressive regimes are protect-
ed in instances where the resistance victimises civilians. 
 
Regarding jurisdictional issues, see subsection in country fiche. 
 
Weapons for Bengal resistance movement:37 In 2010, the Ministry of Justice decided to 
extradite a Danish citizen to India, where the individual concerned is accused of criminal 
offences committed in 1995. He acknowledges having participated in dropping weapons 
meant for a Bengal resistance movement from an aircraft. In 2002, Indian authorities had 
submitted a request for extradition subsequent to a change in Danish law that had made it 
possible to extradite Danish citizens for prosecution also to states outside the Nordic 
countries.  
The Ministry linked the conduct of the accused to the statute on terrorist acts, which 
in 2002 had been inserted into the Penal Code, i.e. Section 114 PC. Previously, equiva-
lent rules had not existed. Precariously, the Ministry also cited Section 114 f PC with the 
aim of offering a subordinate response to the requirement regarding double criminality.  
The Hillerød Municipal Court overruled the administrative decision on extradition on 
the grounds that diplomatic assurances offered by the Indian Government could not be 
taken face value. This ruling was sustained by the High Court. Subsequently, diplomatic 
tensions have prevailed in the relations between India and Denmark. 
 
 
3. Compliance with the Framework Decision 
 
The FD 2002 as well as the FD 2008 have been implemented into Danish 
law in a fairly comprehensive manner, characterised by rather far-reaching 
substantive criminal law provision.The packages of anti-terror legislation 
introduced in 2002 and 2006 include a range of rather uncertain and wide-
reaching provisions that fundamentally challenge the principle of legality.  
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4. Conclusions regarding effects and impact of the Framework Decision 
 
Netwidening 
The basic provision in Section 114 PC covers terrorist acts per se. This pro-
vision is construed to implement the basic requirements of the 2002 Frame-
work Decision on Combating Terrorism. The Framework Decision’s termi-
nology is applied directly in the sense that the definition of a terrorist act has 
been transcribed literally into domestic law without further amelioration. 
Such a legislative technique causes substantial problems with regard to in-
terpretation of the law by the national judiciary. 
A vast number of supplementary statutes are characterised by a substan-
tial widening of the scope of criminal law. These provisions are inchoate in 
the sense that they criminalise various activities that are more or less remote 
from actual or attempted terrorist acts, as well as participation in such ac-
tivities. They not only cover funding and other means of supporting terror-
ism, but any conceivable kind of facilitation, incitement, training or re-
cruitment. This modality of criminal law has rightly been labelled “pre-
active”. To a significant extent, the legislature has even over-implemented 
various legal instruments that are binding on Denmark by virtue of Europe-
an Union law or other international obligations.  
The anti-terror statutes have been drafted in a somewhat loose manner, 
without sufficiently thorough legislative preparations.They constitute a 
common point of reference for all of the other anti-terrorism legislation. The 
challenges regarding rule of law and due process therefore also relate to 
secondary legislation in fields such as law enforcement, intelligence gather-
ing, public law, the treatment of foreigners, preliminary actions under crim-
inal procedure, e.g. wiretapping, bugging, data-sniffing, room searching, 
etc. 
 
Evidence problems 
The cases that have given rise to criminal charges and subsequent prosecu-
tions for violation of the terrorism provisions have been characterised by the 
severe difficulties involved in providing adequate evidence. However, none 
of the cases have concerned terrorist acts that have actually been completed. 
The charges have either focused on the preparation of terrorist acts, or on 
support or facilitation of terrorism activities. Some cases on attempted ter-
rorism have mainly been based on information stemming from the surveil-
lance of groups of people over considerable time periods. If such intelli-
gence or police information indicates a significant risk of an imminent ter-
rorist act, it will trigger immediate pre-emptive intervention. At this point, 
there is not necessarily sufficiently evidence to form the solid basis for an 
indictment, let alone a conviction. However, the risk that a terrorist act will 
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be committed may be considered serious enough that it would be irrespon-
sible to take chances, even if a reticent and hesitant approach with continued 
surveillance could provide greater clarity about the degree of weight behind 
the suspicions. 
The prosecutor’s material has generally been quite complex and difficult 
to decipher, as much of the information is characterised by a certain degree 
of ambiguity. The monitored individuals communicate – via telephone calls, 
internet chat, sms, etc. – in a particular jargon, which can either be con-
strued as a form of sub cultural dialect or as a security-conscious code, pos-
sibly in languages other than Danish. This makes it difficult to determine 
exactly what the aim of the more or less suspicious behaviour and arrange-
ments is, and whether a specific terror intent can be proven. This has, for 
example, given rise to evidence being presented on whether the accused’s 
attitude to society is characterised by an ideological or religious “radicalisa-
tion”. In cases of funding terrorism, it has been relevant to obtain infor-
mation about conditions in distant countries, and this has posed particular 
difficulties in relation to obtaining reliable information from independent 
sources. So far, the acquittal rate has therefore been relatively high. In sev-
eral cases, there has been considerable uncertainty as to the validity of both 
convictions and acquittals. This has attracted particular attention in cases 
where jurors and judges have reached different conclusions concerning the 
question of guilt or innocence. 
 
Overall conclusion regarding added value of the Framework Decision 
Neither the National Security and Intelligence Service, PET, nor other rele-
vant agencies have called for a further widening of the their present powers. 
This notion is confirmed by the following section of the Danish 2007 coun-
try profile at the CODEXTER site:  
 
“In Denmark, the adoption of a first "anti-terror package" in 2002 
and a second "anti-terror package" in 2006, along with a number of 
legislative amendments, has provided the necessary legislative basis 
for effective prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist ac-
tivities.” 
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